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Abstract 
The public water management in irrigated perimeter is marked by some failures. 
We can mention the theft of water, corruption and rent-seeking. These failures result in 
wastage of this scarce resource. We propose to study the public management of 
irrigated perimeter using the theory of transaction cost. To this end, we conduct an 
inquiry in the delegation of "Souk Essebt" in governorate of Jendouba (North West of 
Tunisia). The qualitative and quantitative information collected is used to describe the 
functioning of the perimeter. We conduct descriptive and econometric study to verify 
theoretical hypothesis.  
Keywords: public management of irrigated perimeter, transaction cost, theft of water, 
corruption, rent seeking, transaction cost. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Some economists (Montignoul 1997) consider that the nature of water and the incompleteness 
of contracts on the transaction defend its market management. The market provides an 
optimal allocation of this limited resource. Indeed, the market pricing allows the reallocation 
from less productive users to more productive. But a problem arises at this which is linked to 
the difficulty of quantifying external effects due to the use of water. The latter is also used for 
livestock, domestic use and cottage industries. Others argue for a public management of water 
in the irrigated perimeter. As part of this debate, we study the governance of water in the 
irrigated perimeter of "Souk Essebt" (governorate of Jendouba (north west of Tunisia)). This 
management is marked by some failures such as loss of water that reaches 50% of the amount 
pumped and not marked. In other words, the amount of water consumed is not billed. We 
assume that this wasted water is explained by acts of theft of water. The objective of this 
study is to explain this theft. For this, we adopt as the theoretical framework the theory of 
transaction cost [Williamson 1985, 1991, 1994 and 2002]. Williamson assumes that the 
choice of mode of governance depends on the attributes of the transaction. Transactions that 
relate to water are marked by the specificity, uncertainty and the average frequency. These 
attributes justify the use of public management of water in the irrigated perimeter. By cons, 
bounded rationality and opportunism of the actors of irrigated area (farmers, agents and 
officials of public administration) encourages market water management. At first, we try to 
see how the attributes of the transaction can explain its governance. This development will be 
the first part of this article. In a second step, we try to assess the public management of water 
in the irrigation perimeter. To this end, we present the theoretical model of Rinaudo and al 
(2000) which describes the relation between different actors in the irrigation perimeter. The 
relation is governed by informal agreements between some farmers (nominated by insiders), 
officials of public administration and politicians. Informal agreement deals with rent-seeking 
and corruption paid by "insiders" to officials of public administration. The results of this 
model are subject to empirical verification. To this end, we conducted a survey in the irrigated 
perimeter of "Souk essebt" which allowed us to understand the function (hydraulic, 
agronomic and socio-political) of the perimeter. In addition, this survey allowed us to check 
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whether the assumptions leading or not to observed equilibrium in the perimeter. The data 
collected were the subject of primary and secondary statistical treatment. Finally, we test the 
predictive ability of the theoretical model trough an econometric study.  
 
2. PUBLIC WATER MANAGEMENT: ATTRIBUTES OF THE TRANSACTION 
AND AGENT RATIONALITY 
 
Williamson (1994) considers that the specificity of assets, the frequency and uncertainty 
are the three main attributes that determine the governance mode of the transaction. To what 
extent the attributes of the transaction justify its public mode of governance. 
 
2.1 Attributes of the transaction 
 
We present the attributes which are the frequency, the   
specificity of assets and the uncertainty 
 
2.1.1 The frequency 
 
The frequency of a transaction refers to the idea that certain transactions are repeated 
regularly. On the one hand, the higher the volume of trade, the greater the use of a structure 
created specifically for this transaction can be made profitable (Williamson 1994). On the 
other hand, the frequency is the source of reputation effects. These can give the advantage 
to carry out the transaction in a market. Thus, we can not base ourselves only on the 
frequency to determine the governance mode of the transaction. In the case of irrigated area of 
“Souk Essebt," we believe that demand for water is seasonal. Farmers have an important  
need water from the month of April until September. 
 
2.1.2 Specificity of the assets 
 
The specificity of an asset refers to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to 
alternative uses without loss of productive value (Williamson 1994). The presence of specific 
assets in a transaction makes it impossible to break the contractual relationship without cost. 
Than bilateral dependence follows. This relationship causes the emergence of opportunism. 
One partner may have an incentive to expropriate the quasi-rent created in the transaction. In 
our case, asset specificity is physical and site. Assets and equipments are old and are subject 
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to frequent breakage so maintenance costs have increased sharply. Thus, the private sector has 
no incentive to invest in the water sector particularly in agricultural. This is especially true as 
the duration of these investments is generally higher than the survival time farms. 
 
2.1.3 Uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty refers to "disturbances which are subject transactions" (Williamson 1994). It 
will impact mainly the ex post costs. Thus, increased uncertainty may cause additional costs 
which the State is able to confront. The uncertainty is related to demand and supply of water. 
This poses a problem of adaptation of contracts between irrigators and local government 
(supplier of water) due to the presence of a set of uncontrollable parameters (climate, choice 
of cropping farmers, etc.). Uncertainty can be external or internal. In the first case, it is linked 
to climatic and institutional measures. The scarcity during the dry season increases conflicts 
between users and highlights their opportunistic behavior. Moreover, institutional change 
(change the rules and laws) reinforces the sense of uncertainty and risk among farmers. In the 
second case, uncertainty may be due to the changed situation of the farmer (the change of his 
status), type of crop rotation and opportunistic behavior (diversion of water towers) of some 
actors in the perimeter. Williamson (1994) considers that the more uncertainty, the greater the 
incentive to internalize the transaction.
 
Thus, the attributes (asset specificity and uncertainty) of water justify its public 
governance. 
 
2.2 Bounded rationality 
 
Simon (1991) considers that agents behave rationally. However, they are limited by their 
cognitive abilities to acquire and process information. This limitation is due to the nature of 
"imperfect" of the individual and the environment in which they live. Bounded rationality 
is the source of the incompleteness of contracts and opportunism. These two phenomena 
are linked and cause free riding, corruption (Ostrom 1992) and rent seeking and are source of 
transaction costs. 
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2.2.1 Free-riding 
  
Farmers are not habituated to pay for water. They do not accept the fact that water is an 
economic good. They still regard as a common property (Ostrom 1992). Its allocation is 
based on social, historical and even religious. Only the creation of infrastructure (pumping 
system, capture and transfer equipment) may give the water a certain right of ownership. The 
nature of water explains some opportunistic behaviour of farmers, especially free-riding. Free 
riding is that to take advantage of the collective system without contributing. In the case of 
irrigated area, it is to use water without paying. For this, the farmer can block the counter 
quantifying the amount of water. It can use the water from his neighbours illegally. Other 
methods may also be adopted. Free-riding is not without damage to the hydraulic system. 
Practices of theft of water cause the bursting of the pipe, water loss and interruption of supply 
to other customers.  
 
2.2.2 Corruption 
 
Informal agreements, also known as practical rules (Ostrom 1992), are distinguished from 
the formal rules that are imposed by the state and public administration. They are actually 
used and implemented through individual and collective actions of the participants. 
Practices of certain officials of local public Administration and farmers are marked by 
informal local arrangements that may be in total contradiction with the formal procedures. 
In irrigated systems, it is common to pay a "bribe" to aguadier to access illegally to water. 
This practice is so regular that community members know exactly what price to pay for 
various services rendered. These "bribes" will then form part of the "rules of thumb." The 
process of corruption is based on multiple negotiations between the farmer and the agents of 
administration to establish an informal contract. The terms refer to the amount of water 
illegally acquired and the amount of bribe to pay. In the field, free-riding is quickly spotted. 
Thus, such behavior does not persist over time. By cons, corruption and rent-seeking depends 
on the quality of governance across the whole economy. 
 
2.2.3. Rent seeking  
 
The theory of rent was gradually detached from its original classic design. It was extended to 
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all production factors in situations of scarcity and rigidity of supply (as in water). In a 
contemporary version, it is called the theory of rent-seeking (Krueger 1974). Rent results 
from market imperfections. It is defined as the excess profits that come from the use of factors 
of production compared to what these factors could bring in its best alternative use of 
competitive markets. In irrigated perimeter, some farmers seek to influence (directly or 
indirectly) the officials of the Administration to obtain an additional quantity of water. These 
activities are illegal and part of the rent is redistributed to members of the Administration. 
This redistribution is done in different ways: direct financial transfers in the case of corrupt 
transactions and economic, social and political support.  
Thus, bounded rationality is a source of incomplete contracts and opportunistic behaviour 
(free riding, corruption and rent seeking). These failures do not plead for a public 
management of water in the irrigated perimeter. 
In all, the attributes of the transaction call for its public governance. Indeed, on one side 
assets in transaction have a high degree of specificity; the transaction is characterized by high 
uncertainty and an average frequency. On the other hand, transaction is linked to an 
institutional and political cadre marked by non respect of rules and laws (corruption and rent 
seeking). Moreover, water is considered a sovereign transaction (Williamson 1994). Thus, 
based on the predictions of the theory of transaction costs, a tendency to internalize water 
management in irrigated areas should be found (all things being equal). 
However, the question that we address is: how the opportunistic behavior of the actors of 
irrigated perimeter may hinder the governance of public water? We try to provide some 
answers in what follows. 
 
3. PUBLIC MANAGEMENT OF WATER IN THE IRRIGATED PERIMETER: A 
PROBLEM OF GOVERNANCE 
 
The loss of water is explained by the theft. For example, it is the case when we acquire a 
quantity of water without paying in return for an amount of corruption. Corruption takes 
the form of an informal agreement made between the various players in the irrigated area. To 
represent the behavior of various actors in the perimeter; we adopt the theoretical model of 
Rinaudo et al (2000) which perfectly represents the observed behavior of the actors in 
irrigated perimeter. This development will be the first part of this work. In the second part, 
we try to verify empirically the lessons of the theoretical model. 
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3.1. Behavior of the perimeter players: informal contract 
 
The players of irrigated perimeter are farmers, officials of public administration 
responsible directly or indirectly on water allocation and politicians. Farmers in the 
perimeter are of two types. Firstly farmers who have access to the informal contract, they 
are designated by "insiders" such as politician and / or administration officials. Every 
"insider" negotiates with officials (workers, aguadiers, technicians, cadres of the 
administration, etc.) terms (amount of water illegally acquired and the amount of 
corruption) of the informal contract. While there are farmers who can not access to this 
contract. They are designated by "outsiders". The latter can not maintain direct or indirect 
relationships (high corruption and rent-seeking) with agents of the Administration because 
of their economic and social situation. 
 
3.1.1. Insider’s behavior  
 
Negotiation between an insider farmer and an official of the Administration gives rise to an 
informal contract. The terms refer to the additional water (acquired in an illegal manner) 
and the bribe paid to officials of the Administration. These elements vary from one farmer 
to another in terms of over-quota of water ( iα ) and the bribe received by the agent of the 
Administration which is the amount of corruption ( iγ ). We found on the ground that the 
measure of the amount of illegally water is difficult to measure. However, the act of 
corruption is detected by the finding of a manipulation of water infrastructure (terminal, 
vacuum, solid plate, etc.) which lasts over time. The official knows the demand function of 
the farmer because he knows its area and the type of crop grown. Informal contracts are 
temporary and must be renewed at the end of each season or at the end of each year. This 
renewal can also be explained by the instability of local officials in their positions 
(mutation at any time). Farmers take into account this variable when establishing their 
strategies to minimize their risks. Farmers have an important need of water from April to 
September. The official and the farmer "insider" agree on contract ),( ii γα  such as income 
from corruption: ∑
=
N
i
i
1
γ is maximum given the official constraint (we present it in what 
follows) of the public Administration. In addition, the official does not disclose 
information about insider farmers. This strategy minimizes the information on the intensity 
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of corrupt transactions and reduce the possibility of dispute and coalitions between outsider 
farmers. 
 
3.1.2. Behavior of water managers 
 
Each delegation has a total amount of water ( pQ ) (amount pumped by the hydraulic service 
area) that is shared among a group of farmers. Every act of corruption is an act of diversion of 
resources of amount of iα  for the benefit of users, in return for a sum iγ . Officials chose a total 
level of resources acquired illegally as: dQ = ∑
=
n
i 1
iα  
The choice is such that fpd QQQ −=+ ε  ( fQ is the amount of water billed, pQ  is the amount 
of water pumped by the Administration and ε  is the loss of water due to its infiltration into 
the channels). dQ allows employees to maximize their illegal income given the risk of 
sanctions when their activities were detected. Water loss due to its infiltration (ε ) represents 
more than 15% of the amount pumped by the Administration. The amount of water pumped 
and unbilled is equal to 50%. This loss was the basis for the selection of an optimal  
corruption level. The later depends on the amount of water lost )( dQ . The penalty for the 
quantity )( dQ is denoted )( ds QC , the probability of detecting corruption is denoted 
)( dd Qλ (the probability of detection depends on the amount dQ , if dQ  increases 
so dλ increases) and the income of corrupt officials of the Administration depends on dQ . The 
maximization program of the administration official responsible for the management of water 
is: Max )()()( dsdddi QCQQ λγ − under the constraint of dQ . 
We suppose that the informal agreement can not persist over time, if the superior is not 
involved in the conclusion of this agreement either directly or indirectly. The benefit that can 
have the official is diQγ)1( Φ− . Φ  depends on the willingness of the superior not to 
monopolize the maximum of corruption. This behavior helps to motivate officials (who are at 
the lower hierarchical level) to maximize the amount of corruption. However, the 
expropriation of water resources is not complete nor definitive. In fact, dQ depends on the 
reaction of other farmers outsiders. They can protest and engage in acts of resistance against 
the corrupt and rent seeking. This behavior is very common during the period of water stress. 
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3.1.3. Behavior of outsiders and income of corrupt 
 
Access to the informal agreement is not automatic because of the constraint ( dQ limited). 
Those who can not access (outsiders) may not always remain passive. Because of their 
large numbers, Rinaudo and al (2000) show that the outsiders may engage in compensatory 
action. For example they mobilize government officers and put pressure on local 
Administration. These actions can come from individual actions, group or state. The latter can 
be informed by different sources of corrupt officials. 
The program of the official could be reformulated as follows: 
Max dacdi QCQ ) (Q )1( dλγ −Φ−
 
under the constraint of dQ iγ ( dQ ): the amount of corruption 
in a given volume of water dQ . 
Φ
 : the coefficient of redistribution of the amount of corruption to the immediate superior. 
acC dQ
 :
 costs due to compensatory actions carried out by "outsiders" against officials who 
have been affected by corruption. However, a third actor may occur on the perimeter who is 
the local politician (governor, deputy, etc.). He can defend outsiders or corrupt officials. 
 
3.1.4. Behaviour of politicians and rent-seeking 
 
 
Politicians in the perimeter can influence the decisions of water allocation and thus enter 
the market of rent by various means, including the threat of officials careers such promotion, 
threat of mutation, etc. Politicians can intervene with the officials for some influential farmers 
(faction leader, tribes, landowners, etc.). They can also intervene in favor of outsiders when 
they are organizing in collective action. The irrigated perimeter of "Souk Essebet" is 
characterized by crops that have a great need of water from the April and May until 
September. Small farmers say they can not support the costs of production including the cost 
of water. The intervention of politicians with these farmers will aim to "save" the corn crop. 
This is an important variable of the agricultural policy of the state. These interventions take 
forms of opening of certain irrigated taps sanctioned, debt rescheduling of some farmers, 
credit facilities, etc. This policy reflects the sovereignty of the transaction resulting from the 
sovereignty of the agricultural sector. 
Therefore, the informal agreement concerns three interacting agents and is responsible for 
three types of transaction. With regard to agents, there are farmers insiders, the corrupt 
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officials of local government and politicians. With regard to transactions in the first 
category, insiders exchange with corrupts officials bribes against authorizations exceeded 
quota of water. In the second category, outsiders put pressure on politicians and employees of 
local government. This procedure reduces the illegal income of administration officials. In the 
third category, local politicians influence the decisions of officials by imposing the action to 
take. 
 
3.2. Modelling the behaviour of actors in the irrigated perimeter 
 
To simplify the model formulation presented above, Rinaudo and al (2000) focus on the case 
of a hydraulic system consisting of a secondary channel. This latest conducts water in two 
channels: one upstream and the other downstream. The function of the channel is assumed to 
be controlled by one officer of the local government (aguadier). The purpose of this 
hypothesis is to eliminate the idea of sharing corruption with the supervisors. Each channel 
delivers water to a group of farmers who must have an amount of water noted q . The amount 
of water received from the channel is equal to ε−q2 .ε  is a random variable (E (ε ) = 0 ; et 
ε < q ) which representing the loss of water due to the phenomenon of infiltration. 
 
3.2.1. Formulation of the game 
 
Rinaudo and al (2000) assume that the situation of two farmers is asymmetrical. The insider 
receives an amount of water which is equal to )( α+q ,α  is the amount of additional water 
equal to the amount of corruption γ  given to official monitoring the hydraulic system (often 
aguadier). The farmer outsider receives a quantity of water which is equal to )( α−q . This 
amount is justified by the scarcity of water resources, especially during periods of water 
stress. This applies to the case of an inclined area where some farmers are upstream and other 
downstream. In such cases, if insider monopolizes illegally the amountα , the outsider 
deprives. The game will take place in two stages. In the first step, the two farmers ("insiders" 
and "outsiders") are competing to win the support of the politician. The latter is supposed to 
reduce or prevent the corrupt behaviors of Administration’s officials. In the second stage, the 
farmer insider and the corrupt officials of local government negotiate a contract which dealing 
with corruption )(α and additional quantity of water )(γ . 
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a)
 
Farmers and politicians 
 
The politician plays an important role in the allocation of the resource since he can put 
pressure on the official. The later is controlled by an inspector who belongs to the 
exploitation service. The control is onα . If α > 0, the employee suffers a penalty )(αs , 
)(' αs > 0 and )('' αs < 0. The local politician is solicited by the outsider. The latter 
provides an effort )(X  in lobbying to get the agreement to send an inspector in the 
perimeter. The probability of sending an inspector is an increasing function of political 
lobbying effort made )(X . The inspector can not be corrupted2. The farmer insider is 
investing in the training of political lobbying )(Y . The objective is to reduce the chance of 
sending an inspection. Therefore, the probability of inspection )),(( YXp depends on the 
effort X andY . We hypothesize that 0)(' pXp and 0)(' fYp . This assumption is justified 
by the quality of governance (Kaufman et al 2005) which is marked by a weakness in the 
accountability indicator (-0.99) and corruption control (-0.04)3. The collective action of 
outsiders is formed of small farmers who have low income and who could not get water in 
an illegal manner. The quality of governance is represented by two elements. The first 
relates to the function of punishment ))(( αs  that reflects the regulatory quality and respect 
of rules and laws. The second is related to the function qYXp ),(  which reflects the 
collective action of insiders and outsiders and whose outcome depends on the 
characteristics of the political regime. 
b)
 
Insider and an official of the Administration 
 
The definition of the contract (α ,γ ) is the result of bargaining between the farmer 
"insider" and the officials of local government. In this situation, both partners observeα . 
This negotiation is usually done during the season of water stress (April to September). 
 
3.2.2. Game resolution 
 
Rinaudo and al (2000) were based on the model of Rubinstein (1982) to solve this game. We 
begin by analyzing the agreement between the insider and the officials. We turn then to model 
the behavior of two types of farmer insiders and outsiders, with p ),( YX   and α *   are given. 
                                                 
2
 The purpose of this hypothesis is to eliminate the corrupt behavior modeling at different hierarchical levels. 
3
 See Kaufmann et al 2005. 
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a) Farmer "insider" and official 
The negotiation space is formed by (α ,γ ), α -γ  ≥ 0 is a participation constraint of the 
farmer in the informal agreement and γ - p s (α ) ≥ 0 is aparticipation constraint of the 
official (responsible for water allocation in the irrigated area) to the informal agreement. 
An agreement is possible if there is an interior solution is 1)0(' ps . The utility function of the 
official is represented by the equation:
 
γ ),( YXp (s (α )). It reflects the value of the 
amount of corruption after deducting the value of the penalty multiplied by its probability. 
The utility of the insider is: )( γα − . If we denoted ρ
 
as the power of insider negotiation with
 
10 ≤≤ ρ ,
  
the solution must satisfy the program of maximizing of insider: 
γα ,Max [ ] ρρ αγγα −−− 1))()(,()( sYXp
                                               (1) 
 
Differentiating (1) respectively overα  et γ
 
 we get: 
 
1)('),( =αsYXp                                                                     (2) 
 
 
α -γ = [ ]))()(,(1 αγρ
ρ
sYXp−
−
                                                     (3)  
 
(2) represents the condition of maximization of corruption to share. It corresponds to 
the condition of efficient risk taking. 
(3) represents the sharing rule of corruption. 
(2) and (3) implyα >γ > ),( YXp ))(( αs
                                                                
(4)  
)(αs  is strictly convex, we
 
)()(' ααα ss f , using (2), we show that: 
))()(,()('
)(
α
α
α
α sYXp
s
s
=f
 
Using (3), we show that: 
αααραγ p)()),(( sYXp−−=
. 
The sharing rule of corruption is then: 
)(),( )1( αραργ sYXp+−=
                                                                       (5) 
γ can be analyzed as an incentive contract. The amount of corruption paid to the official 
depends on his effort in negotiating the amount of corruption (1 – ρ ). 
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The program official is: Maximize [ ]))()(,( αγ sYXp−
 
under constraint
 
))())(,()1(( αραργ sYXp+−=
.
 
This program has the solution of equation (2):
 
),( YXp 's (α ) = 1. 
Equation (5) highlights the link between the bargaining power of outsiders and the intensity of 
the incentive for corruption. Plus this power is important, plus the incentive is low. When that 
power tends to 1, the amount of corruption received by the official exactly compensates the 
cost of the penalty that he may suffer and which is equal to P( χ , Υ ) (s(α )).When ρ  tends 
to 0, the official takes up the entire corruption. 
 
b) Farmer insider and farmers outsider 
 
We characterize in this step the response of the official. In the second step, ∗α is 
considered as exogenous and is a decreasing function of the probability of inspection: 
),(* YXpαα =  ; 0' pα                                                                   (6) 
the differential  of the equation (2) with respect to p  gives: 
0)('')(' =





∂
∂
+ α
α
α s
p
ps  
 
0)('')),(
)('( pααα s
YXp
s
p
−
=
∂
∂
 
We consider the function ),(* YXpα as a given and we analyze the behavior of insiders 
and outsiders. Farmers decide to commit resources ( X andY ) in lobbying policy. Each farmer 
seeks to maximize its objective function. The program of the outsider is to maximize X :
 
[ ] XYXpq −− ),(*α (evaluated in terms of monetary income). 
The program of the insider is to maximize q + α *- γ *- Υ
 
that is to 
maximize YYXpsYXpYXpq −−+ ),(),( ),( ** αρρα
. 
The equilibrium of this game is the pair of lobby effort ),( ∗∗ YX which corresponds 
to ),( ** γα  which are the roots of the two equations above. By the derivative of the programs 
of the farmer outsider ( outp ) and insider )( insp respectively over X  and  Y   and we get: 
),(
1
*' YXpX
pout
α
−
=
∂
∂
                                                                                                   (7) 
 
),(
1
* YXpsY
pins
αρ
−
=
∂
∂
                                                                                                  (8) 
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These two equations show that the solution depends on the quality of the institutional 
environment (formal and informal institutions). Indeed, the solutions depend on the 
effectiveness of collective action (lobby) ),( YXp , laws and rules )(αs . In other words, they 
depend on the quality of political governance of Tunisia. To simplify the calculation, 
Rinaudo and al (2000) were based on two assumptions. The first has no theoretical basis. It is 
used to simplify the calculation:
              
  
2
)(:
2
1
α
α
e
sh = ;                                                                                                   (9) 
e  reflects the severity of the sanction. 
the second is inspired by the theory of rent-seeking: 
       
)(),(:2 kpYXph =  avec Y
Xk = .                                                                     (10)       
0)( fkp
 pour k > 0  et )(' kp > 0 
The hypothesis  2h  states that the amount of water illegally acquired depends on the 
ratio of the efforts made by both types of farmers and their power. From the hypothesis 2h  
and equation (7), we obtain: 
2
1)('
eY
kp
α
=
    
                                                                                        
                           (11) 
From ( 2h ) we have : Y
kp
X
p )('
=
∂
∂
   
Combining with (7), we obtain:
 
),('
1)('
YXpY
kp
α
−
=
 
Using (2) and the assumption 1h with α e p  =1, we obtain equation (11). 
From the hypothesis ( 1h ) and equation (8), we show that: 
     
αρeY
Xkp 2)('
2 =                                                                                                  (12) 
The assumption ( 2h ), we obtain 2
)('
Y
kp
Y
p
∂
−=
∂
∂
   
by combining it with equation (7) we obtain:
 
),((
1))('(
2 YXpsY
kpX
αρ
−
=
−
     
Using the assumption ( 1h ), we obtain  22
2)('
αρeY
Xkp
=
 
Combining equations (11) and (12), we obtain: 
Y
X
ρ
2
=                                                                                                              (13)  
This result shows that in equilibrium, the outsider at least twice invests more resources 
in lobbying policy that the insider (because ρ < 1). This can be explained by the power of 
outsiders compared to insiders. The activities of lobbying of "outsiders" depend on the 
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political governance that characterizes Tunisia. Although this result depends on the 
formulation of hypotheses, and it shows the advantage enjoyed by the farmer insider in his 
bargaining power.  
To determine the equilibrium ),,,( **** γαYX of this game, we set a number of 
assumptions: 
I)
ρ
2*
=k  ; this assumption reflects the ratio of the effects of lobbying of farmers; 
II) )( ** kpp =  ; this assumption reflects the probability of inspection at the equilibrium;     
III) )(' *kp=ψ ; this assumption reflects the sensitivity of inspection (ψ ) to a change in the 
level of political interference ( *k ).In other words, it reflects the risk that an inspector be 
manipulated by politicians. We assume that in equilibrium 0
*
=
∂
∂
ψ
p
.  
The solutions of the game are then as follows: 
i) 
*'
* 1
ep
=α  ; 
ii) 
*
*
)
2
1(
ep
ρ
γ
−
=
 
 ; 
iii) 
*2
* 2
ep
X
ρ
ψ
=   ; 
iv) 
*2
*
ep
Y ψ=    . 
i) is obtained from (2); 
 ii) is obtained from (3) and i); 
iii) is obtained from (11); 
 iv) is obtained from iii) and ρ
2
=
Y
X
. 
 
3.2.3. Discussion of the solution 
 
The analytical solution allows us to understand the impact of important parameters on the 
equilibrium of the game. Other parameters can be introduced such that the parameter 
pi (pi such
 
1(
*
=
∂
∂
pi
p
 )). The latter reflects the importance of human, technical (transport 
suitable for all types of terrain, availability of staff for control and monitoring, etc.) and 
financial resources which must have the local public Administration. In the perimeter of 
"Souk Essebt", these means are absents due to lack of funds. The parameters α *, γ *, *X , *Y  
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and
 
*p  describe the behaviour of insiders and outsiders, the bargaining power of insiders 
( ρ ), the capacity of regulatory and legislative power( e ), the sensitivity of the inspection to 
the various pressures(ψ ) and the availability of material and human resources available to the 
inspectors(pi ).These parameters reflect the characteristics of the institutional environment of 
the country and its financial capabilities. These two components affect the public 
management of water in the irrigation perimeter. The summary of results is presented in the 
following table: 
Table 1: Summary of results 
 
The institutional environment: 
Parameters of the equilibrium 
Solution 
equilibrium 
ρ
 
pi
 
e
 
ψ
 
*p
 
- + 0 0 
*α
 
+ - - 0 
*γ
 
+ - - 0 
*X
 
+ - - + 
*Y
 
+ - - + 
                                                    Source : Rinaudo and al (2000) 
Note: (+): positive; (-): negative, (0): no effect 
 
The results show that the amount of water illegally acquired )(α  and the amount of corruption 
)(γ depends on the bargaining power of the insider farmer )(ρ , the inspection (pi ) and the 
severity of punishment represented by ( e ). By cons,
 
α and γ  and do not depend on the 
parameter (ψ ) which represents the sensitivity of the regulatory cadre to political pressure 
caused by outsiders. These results show that opportunistic behavior depend on the quality of 
political governance and the institutional environment in general. In particular, we can 
mention accountability, control of corruption, regulatory quality and enforcement of rules and 
laws. They also depend on the availability of resources (vehicles and personnel) for control 
and monitoring which are limited in the perimeter of “Souk Essebt”. Thus, opportunistic 
behavior (corruption and rent seeking) is explained mainly by the weakness in the indicators 
of the quality of governance and financial resources. 
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We seek, in what follows, to validate the results of the theoretical model presented above.  
 
3.3. Model validation 
 
We try to explain the loss of water (50% of the amount pumped and not billed) in the 
irrigated perimeter of "Souk Essebt." We try to see how this loss can be explained by the 
phenomena presented in the theoretical part. In other words, we try to check if it is acts of 
theft of water, or whether the loss of water depends on the quality of governance. The latter is 
marked by a lack of accountability, a non respect of laws and low control of corruption. 
This climate encourages corrupt behavior and rent-seeking. Prove and measure such 
phenomena is not an easy task. For this, we decide to take an interest in the act of 
manipulating irrigation tap which reflects an act of theft of water that is easy to detect and can 
interpret the phenomena of corruption and rent-seeking. Our study is based primarily on a 
survey conducted in the perimeter. We select variables that characterize the physical, social 
and economic environment of the farmer. We try to analyze the results of treatment of 
information collected during our investigation and at the same time to describe how the data 
were used. We first make univariate analysis of the key variables that gives the primary 
results that merely confirm or disprove the hypotheses. Then we pass to the bivariate analysis, 
which its result gives another dimension. 
 
3.3.1 Empirical data 
 
a) Dependent variable 
We try to detect the theft of water. To this end, we think of acts of handling taps in the 
irrigated perimeter of "Souk Essebt." This act, if it lasts over time, it may reflect an 
informal agreement between the agents of the public Administration and the farmer4. We 
assume that this farmer belongs to the "insiders". He can be a great farmer, an official of 
the public Administration or someone else directly or indirectly involved in politics. He 
uses his power to illegally benefit from an additional quantity of water. For this, we took a 
sample of 200 closed tap (for more than six months) by the local Administration for 
reasons of non-payment of water bills from a set of 800 taps closed for the same reason. 
The perimeter contains 1000 taps which only 200 were operational during the period of 
our investigation. We try to see, among these taps closed, those that have been 
                                                 
4
 Information taken from officials of the public Administration in Jendouba. 
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manipulated to irrigate the land in question. First, we identify 200 taps on the map of 
distribution of the hydraulic system of the perimeter and second we collect all available 
information (irrigated area, wealth, economic and social situation of the farmer, etc.) on 
the owners of these taps. After, we conducted an unannounced visit to these taps during 
the "weekend". We found that, of the 200 taps closed by public Administration, 33 have 
been manipulated to irrigate land in question. However, the sample chosen and the 
duration of the visit (one "weekend") does not allow us to detect all cases of theft of 
water, thus underestimating their actual intensity. Here based on this observation, we 
created a binary variable that describes the state of the tap closed by assigning the value 1 
if it has been manipulated (in other words, farmer use water for irrigation and other uses 
while his tap is normally closed for reasons of non-payment of water bills) and a 0 if not. 
b) Explanatory Variables 
The actual context in which we collected empirical data is more complicated than that 
presented in the theoretical model. On the perimeter, we found that there are several forms 
of manipulation of the irrigation system. We have identified a set of variables that can 
explain directly or indirectly theft of water. These were selected on the basis of theoretical 
studies [Ostrom (1992) and (Rinaudo and al 2000)], the field observations and interviews 
with engineers of public Administration. The main variables are related to the physical, 
economic, social and political context of the farmer. 
Irrigated area ( SUI ): we assume that the theft of water depends on the irrigated area. 
Some consider that the more irrigated area is increasing the need for water increases, the 
tendency of farmers to steal water increases. Others assume that more irrigated area 
increases, the farmer gives off an income that allows him to cover his spending, including 
those related to water. So hi doesn’t need to steal water.  
The presence of a well ( PUI ): the incentives to steal the water are even lower than the 
farmer is able to have a well. The use of well water depends on its abundance, its quality 
and its cost of extraction. PUI  is a binary variable, which takes the value 1 if there is a 
well on the parcel of land irrigated by the tap and a value of 0 if none. 
The residence of the farmer ( RES ): some consider the character of the resident farmer 
may discourage stealing water because he takes care of his reputation. By cons, others 
consider that to be a resident in the land let him developing relationships with agents of 
local Administration and he can acquire water in an illegal manner.
 
RES is a binary 
variable that takes the value 1 if the farmer is resident and 0 otherwise. 
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Livestock ( ELE ): Some assume that the diversification of activities as the practice of 
livestock, can weaken the incentive for the farmer to steal water. In this case, agriculture 
is not the only source of income for the farmer. ELE
 
is a polytomous variable that takes 
the value 2 if the farmers practice livestock of cattle and sheep, 1 if he only practices one 
type of livestock (sheep or cattle) and 0 if he not practices any type of livestock. 
Possession of machines or transports ( 1MAC ): some consider that this provides 
information on the type of farmer (poor or rich). If he is equipped with machinery and 
transportation he will be less incentive to steal water (all things being equal). 1MAC is a 
binary variable that takes the value 1 if the farmer has machines or transport and 0 
otherwise. 
Intensification of culture ( INC ): some suppose that if farmer cultivates his land (more than 
once a year), he needs water so he is more prompted to steal. The intensification of culture  is 
a polytomous variable that takes the value 1 if the farmer cultivates once a year, 2 if he 
cultivates twice a year and 3 if he cultivates his land three times a year. However, we note that 
the effect of this variable is ambiguous. For some, the cultivation of the land more than once 
during the same year shows that the farmer works and increases his income, therefore, he 
does not need to steal water. For others, the need for water, following the intensification of 
farming, let him to steal the water. 
Farmer administrative and / or politician (CAP ): we have shown that in the theoretical 
model, the cost of obtaining water illegally depends on the bargaining power of insiders. We 
assume that they are generally administrative and / or politicians. We assume that a farmer 
"insider" ( CAP ) reflects the presence of corrupt behavior and rent-seeking. CAP  is a binary 
variable that takes the value 1 if the manipulated tap belongs to politician farmer or to farmer 
who has a directly or indirectly relation with Administration and 0 otherwise. 
 
3.3.2. Descriptive study for explanatory and predictive study 
a) Univariate analysis of variables 
 
Univariate analysis of variables shows that on average irrigated area is of 45 hectares. We 
find that 59%6 of taps that make up our sample are accompanied by well. However, the 
high cost of drilling implies that the important source of water is the water of the North 
purchased by the administration. 85%7 of taps are owned by resident farmers. 47%8 of the 
                                                 
5
 See table 1 of annex. 
6
 See table 2 of annex. 
7
 See table 3 of annex. 
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taps belonging to farmers who practice the cattle or sheep. 60%9 of the taps belonging to 
farmers who have machines. 44.7%10 of the taps belonging to farmers who cultivate their 
land twice a year. 61.5%11 of taps are shared taps. 61.5%12 of the taps belonging to farmer 
administrative and/or politician or en general who has a directly or indirectly relation with 
the two latter. Univariate study shows that farmers have an important need for water and 
the well water has a high degree of salinity. The majority of farmers are residents. The 
percentage of farmers who have the machines and who cultivate their land twice shows 
that these farmers aren’t poor farmers. The majority of farmers are involved in politics 
and taps are mostly shared taps. 
 
b) Bivariate analysis of variables 
 
The bivariate analysis shows that 54.6%13 of manipulated taps belong to outsiders, against 
45.4% for insiders. In addition, there is a significant relationship (r = 4.29 and p = 0.03)14 
between the manipulated taps and political and social characteristic of farmer. 45.4%15 of 
manipulated taps are shared taps. The analysis shows that there is a relationship (r= 4.29 and p 
= 0.03)16 between manipulated taps and shared taps. 43%17 of manipulated taps belongs to 
farmers who cultivate one a year their land, 50% of manipulated taps belongs to farmers who 
cultivate twice a year their land and 0,06% of manipulated taps belongs to farmers who 
cultivate three times a year their land. Furthermore, there is no a relation between manipulated 
taps and crop intensification ( 2χ = 0,72 et p = 0,69)18. We find that 46%19 of manipulated 
taps belong to farmers who are owned machines. There is a relation ( 2χ = 3,23 et p=0,072)20 
between manipulated taps and possession of machines.  45%21 of manipulated taps belongs to 
farmers who don’t practice animal husbandry, 49 of manipulated taps belongs to farmers who 
practice one type of animal husbandry and 15% of manipulated taps belongs to farmers who 
                                                                                                                                                        
8
 See table 4 of annex. 
9
 See table 5 of annex. 
10
 See table 6 of annex. 
11
 See table 7 of annex. 
12
 See table 8 of annex. 
13
 See table 10 of annex. 
14
 See table 10a of annex. 
15
 See table 11 of annex. 
16
 See table 11a of annex. 
17
 See table 12 of annex. 
18
 See table 12 a of annex. 
19
 See table 13 of annex. 
20
 See table 13a of annex. 
21
 See table 14 of annex. 
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practice two types of animal husbandry (sheep and cattle). We notice that it doesn’t exist a 
relationship between manipulated tap and animal husbandry ( 2χ = 2, 10 et p = 0, 35)22. 12%23  
of manipulated taps belong to non resident farmers against 87% for resident farmer. 
Furthermore, it doesn’t exist any relationship between manipulated taps and the residence of 
farmers ( 2χ = 0, 25 et p = 0, 61)24. 46%25 of manipulated taps belong to farmers who have 
machines. There is a relation (r= 3.23 and p = 0.072)26 between manipulated taps and 
possession of machines. 43%27 of manipulated taps owned by farmers who own wells and 
there is a relationship (r = 4.48 and p = 0.034)28 between manipulated taps and possession of 
wells. Manipulated taps is independent of the irrigated area. Indeed, F is low (0.35)29 and 
insignificant (0.55)30, than the equality of means is confirmed. 
We summarize the results of the bivariate study in the following table: 
Table 2: Summary of results of bivariate study 
 
Characteristics of farmer and his the 
physical and socio-political 
environment 
Manipulated taps 
- Farmer "politicians"; 
- Shared taps; 
- Farmers with machines ; 
- Presence of wells; 
- Crop Intensification ; 
- Animal husbandry; 
- Character resident of the farmer; 
- Area irrigated. 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Note: (0: no effect on the manipulated taps; +: positive effect on the manipulated taps). 
 
Thus, manipulation of taps is not linked to material factors such the water requirement and 
the economic situation of farmers. Indeed, the intensification of crops, animal husbandry 
and irrigated area are not related to acts of manipulation of taps. For cons, the variables 
"have a well" and "possession of machines" are positively related to the manipulation of 
taps. Moreover, this descriptive study found that formal (political party, social or 
                                                 
22
 See table 14a of annex. 
23
 See table 15 of annex. 
24
 See table 15a of annex. 
25
 See table 16 of annex. 
26
 See table16a of annex. 
27See table17 of annex. 
28
 See table17a of annex. 
29
 See table18 of annex. 
30
 See table18a of annex. 
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economic) and informal (tribute, village or social class) membership to a group may be 
related to opportunistic behavior of some players of the perimeter. 
After summarizing all the information from the survey, we try to verify and generalize the 
results. 
c) A multivariate explanatory analysis 
 
i) Presentation of the model 
 
The dependent variable, denoted Y , is a qualitative binary. It takes the value 1 if the taps 
manipulated reveals the presence of a corrupt transaction, so an informal agreement and 0 
otherwise. The value taken by Y depends on the value of net income that the farmer hopes 
to get and which is a result of the manipulation of the irrigation system. If this value is 
positive, Y equal to 1,
 
if not
 
Y = 0. This benefit corresponds to a latent variable 
denoted *Y , whose values are not observable. 
Υ *
 = ∑
i
α i iX  +σ  
Υ *: value of the latent variable; 
Υ  = 1 if Υ * >0; 
iX  : explanatory variables; 
α i : coefficient of the explanatory variable; 
σ  : residue. 
The estimation method used is the automated logistic regression ("stepwise"). 
ii) Discussion and Interpretation of results 
Table 2: results of specification 
Endogenous variables: Υ
 
Variables Coefficient Wald (t-stat) probability 
1BOF  0,71 3,37 0,06 
RES  -0,89 4,93 0,02 
 INC  -0,64 8,88 0,00 
2R ajusté 0,49 - - 
Overall Percentage 83,0 - - 
 
We estimated coefficients of the full model that is to say all the variables that may explain 
the manipulation of the taps. However, the coefficients were not significant. We have 
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gradually simplified the model to retain only three variables which their coefficients are 
significant: the presence of shared taps 1BOF , the residence of farmer RES
 
and crop 
intensification INC . 
The model explains 49%31 of the variance of the dependent variable [R ² = 49%] and the 
model is true in 83% of cases. 
The presence of shared taps affects positively32 its manipulation. This result confirms the 
bivariate analysis which shows that there is a relationship between the shared taps and its 
manipulation. Sharing the same taps encourages opportunistic behavior. No one can reveal the 
opportunistic behavior of the other is himself involved. The informal institution (the feeling of 
belonging to the group) is a revelation of an insurance against sanction of opportunistic 
behavior. Beside, the lack of control and monitoring encourages this opportunistic behavior. 
The resident character of farmer explains negatively the manipulation of taps. The more the 
farmer is resident, the less he has incentive to manipulate taps. Ostrom (1992) shows that the 
residence of the farmer incentive him to have an appropriate behavior. This result highlights 
the role of informal institutions (reputation) in determining the behavior of agents that is 
based on honor, respect for laws, values and traditions. 
Crop intensification explains negatively the manipulation of taps. More land is cultivated 
more than once a year, unless the taps are manipulated. In other words, the crop 
intensification reflects a high income of farmer which explains the reduction of opportunistic 
behaviour. This result is confirmed also by studies of Ostrom (1992) who shows that income 
or wealth explains positively coordination and cooperation between government and farmers. 
Thus, the econometric study showed that theft of water (via the manipulation of taps) can be 
explained mainly by material and institutional factors. Indeed, the lack of equipment 
(vehicles) and agents (aguadiers) encouraged the theft of water. In addition, the sense of 
security due to belonging to group membership and financial position of farmers explain the 
theft of water. 
 
3.3.3. Implications: large and / or small corruption 
 
The empirical study presented in this work has validated the theoretical model in part 
(Rinaudo and al 2000). It showed that outsiders may put pressure on officials of public 
Administration. Indeed, the penalty (the closure of taps) also applies to insiders (45.4%) and 
outsiders (54.6%). 
                                                 
31
 See table 19 of annex. 
32
 See table 19a of annex. 
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The lack of monitoring and control of the hydraulic system explain the theft of water that is 
practiced by insiders and outsiders. Thus, this study confirmed the presence of the phenomena 
of free riding and small corruption (54.6% of taps manipulated belong to outsiders against 
45.4% for the insiders). However, the enormous loss of water that reaches 50% of the amount 
pumped and not billed can not be explained only by the free-riding (which is quickly spotted) 
and small corruption that is not stable over time (change of officials of local government and 
pressure of the collective action of "outsiders"). 
Thus, this study proves with certainty only the existence of the phenomenon of free riding and 
small corruption. The method we used could not reveal the grand corruption and rent seeking. 
This failure is explained by two phenomena. The first is theoretical and related to a lack of 
tools for analysis and quantification of transaction costs due to the behavior of corruption and 
rent-seeking. The second refers to a lack of data to measure these phenomenas. 
 
4. Conclusion  
Based on the finding of a great loss of water in the governorate of Jendouba (north west of 
Tunisia), this work aimed to see whether the public management of water in the irrigation 
perimeter is the appropriate mode of governance. Two parties compose this work. In the first, 
we presented the attributes of the transaction relating to the water. We have shown that the 
asset is highly specific and the life of the equipment is limited in time and requires continued 
investment. The transaction is uncertain and highly frequency in summer. Based on these 
attributes and under the teachings of the theory of transaction costs, public management 
seems to be the appropriate mode of governance. In the second part, we discussed the 
problem linked to public governance of water in the irrigated perimeter.  The nature of water 
and bounded rationality of agents leads to the incompleteness of contracts which encourages 
opportunistic behavior of some players in the irrigated area. This opportunism results in acts 
of theft of water, which is scarce in Tunisia. This theft is explained by the activities of free 
rider, corruption and rent-seeking. To study these aspects, we adopted the theoretical model of 
Rinaudo and al (2000), which describes the behavior of actors in the irrigation perimeter. This 
model highlights some opportunistic behavior of the perimeter players, including free riding, 
corruption and rent seeking. These players are "insiders" who can access to informal 
agreements on corruption and rent seeking. As against the "outsiders" are those who are 
excluded from these agreements. We tried to verify this behavior in the perimeter to explain 
the significant loss of water. In addition to collecting data related to economic and social 
variables of the farmer, we conducted an informal survey to detect the theft of water. The 
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treatment of the data showed that in addition to outsiders, there are two categories of insiders: 
big and small insiders. Small insiders use corruption to acquire an additional quantity of water 
in an illegal manner. The theft of outsiders is explained by the lack of control and monitoring 
of hydraulic equipment in perimeter. However, this study does not allow us to identify the 
great insiders who do not need to manipulate their taps to acquire illegally water they are 
involved directly in the decision of allocation of the resource. 
In addition, our study was has led to four main contributions. First, we showed that informal 
agreements (corruption or rent-seeking) are explained by the quality of political governance, 
including lack of accountability. Second, the informal rules can explain and affect the 
behavior of individuals. Third, the choice of governance must be registered as part of the 
remediable inefficiencies, that is to say, it can be adopted only if it corresponds to a net gain. 
The latter is not only the result of applying the principle of alignment but also the nature of 
the environment (economic, political and social) of the transaction. Fourth, it has emerged 
from our study that while small corruption is explained by financial constraints (low-income 
of employees of the Administration), great corruption is informally institutionalized. 
Consequently, any form of governance depends on the nature of the transaction and the 
environment in which will not appear a feasible alternative solution at lower cost. 
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Annexe i 
Localisation du périmètre de Souk Essebt 
Le périmètre de Souk Essebt se situe à 15 kilomètres à l’Est de la ville de Jendouba et à 16 
km de la ville de Bou Salem. Le périmètre appartient à la délégation de Jendouba Sud. 
Ses limites physiques sont : 
a) Au nord : Oued Medjerda ; 
b) A l’Ouest : Oued Mellègue ; 
c) A l’Est : Oued Tessa ; 
d) Au Sud : des collines. 
Le périmètre a une superficie de 5300 ha et il est irrigué à partir des eaux du barrage Bou 
Heurtma et du barrage Mellégue. 
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Annexe ii 
Démonstration des résultats du modèle de Rinaudo (2000) 
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Annexe iii 
Ressource en eau du périmètre 
Depuis sa mise en service en 1984, le périmètre est alimenté par les eaux du barrage Bou 
Heurtma jusqu’à la mise en service du périmètre Bou Heurtma III (superficie 3800 ha) en 
Mars 2002. Depuis cette date, les deux périmètres sont irrigués par l’eau mélangée dans le 
bassin de stockage B2 provenant de deux barrages Mellègue et Bou Heurtma. Les eaux de 
deux barrages sont refoulées via deux stations de pompage respectivement PAP2 (barrage 
Bou Heurtma) et BH3 (barrage Mellègue) dans le bassin de mélange et de mise en charge B2. 
Actuellement et dans le cadre de l’orientation générale d’économie d’énergie, les eaux du 
bassin B2 proviennent du barrage Bou Heurtma. 
 
 
Table 1 
Average irrigated area 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
irrigated area 200 ,405 8,000 4,29051 1,429197 
Valid N (listwise) 200 
    
                                                                                (Source : our calculation on SPSS) 
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Table 2 
Presence of wells 
Presence of wells 
 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Absence of wells 82 21,8 41,0 41,0 
Presence of wells 118 31,3 59,0 100,0 
Valid 
Total 200 53,1 100,0 
 
Missing System 177 46,9 
  
Total 377 100,0 
  
(Source : our calculation on SPSS) 
 
Table 3 
Farmers residence 
Farmers residence 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Non resident farmers 30 8,0 15,0 15,0 
Resident farmers 170 45,1 85,0 100,0 
Valid 
Total 200 53,1 100,0 
 
Missing System 177 46,9 
  
Total 377 100,0 
  
                                                                                                                    (Source :our calculation on SPSS) 
 
Table 4 
 Practices of cattle and sheep 
Practice of cattle and sheep 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Non practices  69 18,3 34,5 34,5 
Practices of cattle or sheep  94 24,9 47,0 81,5 
Practices of cattle and sheep 37 9,8 18,5 100,0 
Valid 
Total 200 53,1 100,0 
 
Missing System 177 46,9 
  
Total 377 100,0 
  
(Source : our calculation on SPSS) 
 
Table 5  
 Possession of  machines 
Possession of machines 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
No machines 81 21,5 40,5 40,5 
Machines 119 31,6 59,5 100,0 
Valid 
Total 200 53,1 100,0 
 
Missing System 177 46,9 
  
Total 377 100,0 
  
(Source : our calculation on SPSS) 
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Table 6  
 Intensification of culture 
Intensification of culture 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Culture once a year 86 22,8 45,7 45,7 
Culture twice a year 84 22,3 44,7 90,4 
Culture three times a year 18 4,8 9,6 100,0 
Valid 
Total 188 49,9 100,0 
 
Missing System 189 50,1 
  
Total 377 100,0 
  
(Source: our calculation on SPSS) 
 
Table 7 
 Shared taps 
Shared taps 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Absence of shared taps 77 20,4 38,5 38,5 
Presence de shared taps 123 32,6 61,5 100,0 
Valid 
Total 200 53,1 100,0 
 
Missing System 177 46,9 
  
Total 377 100,0 
  
(Source : our calculation on SPSS) 
 
Table 8 
 Administrative and/ or politician farmer  
 
Farmer administrative  and/or politician 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Farmer who is neither administrative nor politician  77 20,4 38,5 38,5 
Farmer who is administrative and/or politician 123 32,6 61,5 100,0 
Valid 
Total 200 53,1 100,0  
Missing System 177 46,9   
Total 377 100,0   
(Source : our calculation on SPSS) 
 
Table 9  
 Percentage of manipulated taps 
 
Percentage of manipulated taps 
 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Intact taps 167 44,3 83,5 83,5 
Manipulated taps 33 8,8 16,5 100,0 
Valid 
Total 200 53,1 100,0 
 
Missing System 177 46,9 
  
Total 377 100,0 
  
(Source: our calculation on SPSS) 
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Table 10 
 Cross-table between manipulated taps and political and social characteristics of  farmer 
Manipulated taps * political and social characteristic of farmer 
Count 
Political and social characteristic of farmer   
Farmer who is neither administrative nor 
politician 
Farmer who is administrative and/or 
politician 
Total 
 Intact taps 59 108 167 Manipulated 
taps Manipulated 
taps 18 15 33 
Total 77 123 200 
 
Table 10a 
 Test de 2χ  
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4,297a 1 ,038   
Continuity Correctionb 3,524 1 ,060   
Likelihood Ratio 4,189 1 ,041   
Fisher's Exact Test    ,050 ,031 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
4,276 1 ,039   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12,71. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
(Source : nos calcul sur SPSS) 
 
 
Table11 
  Cross-table between manipulated and shared taps 
Manipulated taps* shared tap Crosstabulation 
Count 
  Shared tap 
  Absence of shared taps Presence of shared taps Total 
Iintact taps 59 108 167 Manipulated taps 
Manipulated taps 18 15 33 
Total 77 123 200 
(Source : our calculation on SPSS) 
 
Table 11a  
 
2χ Test 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4,297a 1 ,038   
Continuity Correctionb 3,524 1 ,060   
Likelihood Ratio 4,189 1 ,041   
Fisher's Exact Test    ,050 ,031 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4,276 1 ,039   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12,71. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
(Source :our calculation on SPSS) 
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Table 12 
Cross table between manipulated taps and crop intensification 
Manipulated taps* crop intensification Crosstabulation 
Count 
  
Crop intensification 
  
Culture once a 
year 
Culture twice a 
year 
Culture three times a 
year  
Total 
 Intact taps 72 68 16 156 Manipulated taps 
Manipulated 
taps 14 16 2 32 
Total 86 84 18 188 
(Source: our calculation on SPSS) 
 
Table 12a 
 
2χ Test 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square ,723a 2 ,697 
Likelihood Ratio ,767 2 ,682 
Linear-by-Linear Association ,016 1 ,899 
N of Valid Cases 188 
  
a. 1 cells (16,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3,06. 
                                                                                                (Source: our calculation on SPSS) 
 
Table 13 
Cross table between manipulated taps and  possession of machines 
Manipulated taps * possession of machines Crosstabulation 
Count 
Machines   
Absence of amachines Possession of  machines Total 
Intact taps 63 104 167 Tap manipulated 
Manipulated taps 18 15 33 
Total 81 119 200 
 
Table 13a 
2χ Test
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3,235a 1 ,072   
Continuity Correctionb 2,575 1 ,109   
Likelihood Ratio 3,179 1 ,075   
Fisher's Exact Test    ,083 ,055 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3,219 1 ,073   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13,37. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
(Source: our calculation on SPSS) 
 
 
Table 14 
Cross  table between manipulated taps and type of animal husbandry 
Manipulatad taps *Animal husbandry Crosstabulation 
Count 
  
Animal husbandry 
  
Absence of 
animal 
husbandry 
One type of 
animal 
husbandry 
Two type of 
animals 
husbandry 
Total 
Intact taps 54 81 32 167 Manipulated taps 
Manipulated taps 15 13 5 33 
Total 69 94 37 200 
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Table 14a 
 Test de 2χ  
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2,101a 2 ,350 
Likelihood Ratio 2,036 2 ,361 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1,595 1 ,207 
N of Valid Cases 200 
  
a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6,11. 
                                                                                              (Source: our calculation on SPSS) 
 
 
Table 15  
 Cross table between taps  manipulation and residence of farmes 
Manipulated taps * Residence of farmes Crosstabulation 
Count 
  Farmer 
  non -resident resident Total 
Intact taps 26 141 167 Manipulated taps 
Manipulated taps 4 29 33 
Total 30 170 200 
 
Table 15 a  
2χ Test
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig.             
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square ,257a 1 ,612 
  
Continuity Correctionb ,058 1 ,810 
  
Likelihood Ratio ,269 1 ,604 
  
Fisher's Exact Test 
   
,792 ,421 
Linear-by-Linear Association ,256 1 ,613 
  
N of Valid Cases 200 
    
a. 1 cells (25,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4,95. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
(Source :our calculation on  SPSS) 
 
Table 16 
Cross table between manipulated taps and possession of the machines  
  
Manipulated taps * possession of machines Crosstabulation 
Count 
 machines   
no possession of machines Possession of machines Total 
Intact taps 63 104 167 Taps manipulation 
Manipulated taps 18 15 33 
Total 81 119 200 
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Table 16 a 
2χ Test 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value Df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3,235a 1 ,072   
Continuity Correctionb 2,575 1 ,109   
Likelihood Ratio 3,179 1 ,075   
Fisher's Exact Test    ,083 ,055 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3,219 1 ,073   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13,37. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
(Source: our calculation on SPSS) 
 
Table 17 
Cross table between manipulated taps and possession of wells  
 
Manipulated taps * Possession of wells Crosstabulation 
Count 
  Wells 
  No wells Possession of wells Total 
Iintacts taps 63 104 167  Taps 
Manipulated taps 19 14 33 
Total 82 118 200 
 
 
Table 17a 
 
2χ Test 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4,489a 1 ,034   
Continuity Correctionb 3,706 1 ,054   
Likelihood Ratio 4,415 1 ,036   
Fisher's Exact Test    ,052 ,028 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4,466 1 ,035   
N of Valid Cases 200     
a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13,53. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
(Source: our calculation on SPSS) 
 
Table 18 
 Test of equality groups 
Group Statistics 
Valid N (listwise) Manipulation of  taps Mean Std. Deviation Unweighted Weighted 
Intact taps Irrigated area 4,31744 1,458342 167 167,000 
Manipulatad taps Irrigated area  4,15421 1,283326 33 33,000 
Total Irrigated area 4,29051 1,429197 200 200,000 
(Source: our calculation on SPSS) 
 
 
 
Table 18a 
Test of equality of means 
Tests of Equality of Group Means 
 
Wilks' Lambda F df1 df2 Sig. 
Irrigated area ,998 ,358 1 198 ,550 
            (Source: our calculation on  SPSS) 
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Table 19 
Estimation results 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 173,824a ,370 ,493 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001. 
 
Table 19a  
Cassification table 
Classification Tablea 
Predicted 
Taps 
 
Observed 
Intact taps Manipulated taps Percentage Correct 
Intact taps 154 2 98,7 Taps 
Manipulated taps 30 2 6,3 Step 1 
Overall Percentage   83,0 
a. The cut value is ,500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
BOF(1) ,710 ,387 3,370 1 ,066 2,034 
RES -,890 ,401 4,934 1 ,026 ,411 Step 1a 
INC -,645 ,216 8,886 1 ,003 ,524 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: BOF, RES, INC. 
 
 
 
Table  20  
 Volume pomped and billed (1999- 2004) 
Years 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 
Volume pomped 103m3 19681 14334 21743 12970 11614 
Volume billed 103m3 10407 6386 12907 7760 5811 
Efficience % 53 54 59 60 50 
                                                                                 (Source : CRDA Jendouba) 
Table 21 
  Fluctuation of rate of unpaid bills in  Souk Essebt 
Years  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Rate of unpaid bills (%) 90 85 83 87 84 94 
                                                                                       (Source : CRDA Jendouba) 
Table 22  
 Number of farmers sharing  taps 
Number  of  farmers Number of sharing taps 
2 199 
3 162 
4 31 
5 7 
6 4 
7 2 
Total 405 
                                                             (Source : CRDA Jendouba) 
 
 
 
